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The global economic crisis has led to a massive increase in unemployment, and 
nearly all governments have declared the protection of domestic jobs to be a cen-
tral economic policy aim. In the US, an additional $790-billion economic stimulus 
package was adopted immediately after President Obama took office. The package 
includes a “Buy American” clause intended to give preferential treatment to domestic 
suppliers in public procurement, and is leading to countermeasures by other coun-
tries. In some cases, there have been tariff increases and trade-distorting currency 
depreciations. Already the announcement of protectionist measures can have im-
mediate adverse effects on policy decisions elsewhere and one is reminded of the 
US Smoot-Hawley act of 1930 with its dramatic negative  consequences on  global 
trade and economic growth afterwards.
Efforts should be made to strengthen multilateral organizations at this moment in the 
current global crisis. DIW Berlin advocates the reform of the International Monetary 
Fund. In addition, the G-20 should play a larger role in combating international 
financial crises. Finally, in the future, the EU should only be represented in the G-20 
by a single representative.
In the US, real GDP declined at an annualized rate of 6.3% in the fourth quarter 
of 2008.1 The contraction of the US economy thus accelerated toward the end 
of last year. At the beginning of 2009, unemployment reached 7.6%—the 
highest level since 1992. In February 2009 the US economy shed 651,000 jobs 
again. This was the worst month of job losses since December 1974.2 In order 
to counteract these negative trends, an economic stimulus package of US$790 
billion was passed.3
The package requires government agencies in the US to give preferential treatment 
to domestic suppliers when awarding contracts with stimulus funds. This would 
constitute a clear violation of the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
1  US Bureau of Economic Analysis: Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2008 (Final), press release on 26 March 
2009.
2  US Bureau of Labor Statistics: The Employment Situation, February 2009, press release on 6 March 2009.
3  H:R.1 Amendment No. 98 in the Senate of the United States—111th Cong. 1st Session. Additional information 
about the legislative history of this amendment is available at http://readthestimulus.org/index.php.International Trade Under Threat
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and  NAFTA  (North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement).4 The “Buy American” clause, which 
requires foreign suppliers to underbid US com-
panies by 25% to be considered for a contract, is 
equivalent to a protective tariff of the same size. 
According to an initial assessment by the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, implementa-
tion of the “Buy American” clause would only create 
around 9,000 jobs. Between 6,500 and 65,000 
jobs would be lost, however, due to protection-
ist countermeasures taken by other countries. 
A  growing  number  of  countries—including 
Argentina, Brazil, China, France, the UK, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Canada, and Russia—have al-
ready taken initial steps toward shielding their 
national markets.5
The danger of the “Buy American” clause is 
compounded by the interconnectedness of the 
global economy, as production disruptions could 
be triggered worldwide. Additional problems 
could also result for US companies if they are 
unable to rely on longstanding business relations 
with foreign partners. Moreover, considerable 
bureaucratic problems and monitoring expenses 
in connection with practical implementation of 
the Buy American clause are likely.
This unilateral action by the US not only heightens 
the threat of a trade war, it also patently contradicts 
President Obama’s declared intentions. Stronger 
international cooperation and the coordination 
of American economic and foreign policy is a 
prerequisite for the urgently necessary reform of 
the global economic and financial order. Doubts 
about the willingness of the US to make reforms 
in this area would encourage other countries to 
embark on their own course.
Which US Trading Partners Would 
Be Particularly Affected?
The US is economically interconnected first and 
foremost with its two NAFTA trading partners, 
Canada and Mexico (Fig. 1). Approximately one 
quarter of all US imports originate from these 
countries (15% and 10%, respectively). Other 
important trading partners are China (17.4%), 
the EU (15.8%), and oil-exporting countries like 
Saudi Arabia (12.3%). By comparison, countries 
such as Japan (5.8%), South Korea (2%), Russia 
4  Hufbauer, G. C., J.J. Schott: Buy American: Bad for Jobs, Worse for Re-
putation, Policy Brief, Number PB09-2, Peterson Institute for Internatio-
nal Economics, Washington, D.C.
5  The  World  Bank  has  compiled  a  summary  of  protectionist  actions 
taken  worldwide  since  October  2008.  See  World  Bank:  Trade  Notes, 
Number 37, 2 March 2009.
(1.5%), and India (1.2%) are only of secondary 
importance where US imports are concerned. With 
an import share of 4.1%, Germany is the US’s most 
important European supplier, ahead of the UK, 
which has a 3% share.
Old and New Forms of Protectionism
Aside from traditional methods of protectionism 
such as tariffs, which are now tightly regulated 
by international agreements, there are more sub-
tle means of erecting barriers to foreign suppliers 
who want to enter a market (Fig. 2). Influencing 
exchange rates to achieve a systematic devaluation 
of one’s own currency and thus a price advantage 
for exports should also be considered a “non-tariff” 
barrier to trade.6
6  China has been criticized by many trading partners, particularly the 
US, for keeping the value of its currency artificially low. For more infor-
mation, see the website of the Peterson Institute for International Eco-
nomics  in  Washington,  D.  C.,  www.iie.com/research/topics/hottopic.
cfm?HotTopicID=3, as well as scholarship from J.A. Frieden on the fun-
damental reform of the global monetary system: Global Governance of 
Global Monetary Relations: Rationale and Feasibility, in: Economics (e-
Journal), Vol. 3, March 2009.
Figure 1
US Imports According to Country of Origin  
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A new form of protectionism could arise if, in 
the course of the global financial crisis, restric-
tive lending policies are practiced in relation to 
foreign borrowers. The extensive nationalization 
of banks in numerous OECD countries and the 
massive government expenditure to recapitalize 
the banking sector are generating strong political 
demands for the granting of credit on a preferen-
tial or even exclusive basis to domestic companies 
as well as calls for the alignment of lending to the 
demands of the domestic economy. This, however, 
would make it more difficult or impossible for for-
eign borrowers to access credit markets. In extreme 
cases, it could even result in balance-of-payments 
crises between entire nations.7
Companies in nations with underdeveloped capital 
markets and high national budget deficits would be 
especially hard hit by political intervention in credit 
markets. The World Bank, for example, anticipates 
that developing nations will have a finance deficit 
of $270 to $700 billion this year as a result of the 
global financial crisis.8
7  Eichengreen, B.: Capital Flows and Crisis, Cambridge, MA, 2004.
8  Theis,  D.  M.:  Crisis  Reveals  Growing  Finance  Gaps  for  Developing 
Countries, March 2009 press release, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Moreover, the restructuring of national financial 
systems is leading in many cases to a concentra-
tion of market power among a small number of 
dominant firms, which makes lending more ex-
pensive due to reduced competition. In countries 
that limit the ability of foreign financial institutions 
to enter domestic markets, a consolidation of the 
banking sector results in deadweight losses.
Substantial Deadweight Losses From 
Protectionism
A 1992 analysis on protectionism focused exclu-
sively on the cost to consumers resulting from a 
reduced variety of products. The study, which was 
premised on a decline in international trade of 
25%, estimated average global deadweight loss-
es—i.e. in general terms, a decrease in income—of 
approximately 5%.9 These losses are compounded 
by a drop in efficiency on the production side, 
especially if returns to scale exist, because firms 
produce fewer units and thus at higher unit costs 
when there is a reduction in trade. These losses 
9  Feenstra, R. C.: How Costly is Protectionism? in: Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 6, 1992, 159 ff. The margin of fluctuation in various 
scenarios based on this average is relatively high at 2–8%.
Figure 2
Forms of Protectionism in Selected Countries
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can be inferred from studies regarding efficiency 
gains due to trade deregulation with returns to scale 
(for example, deregulation in North America). The 
estimates in these studies diverge widely depend-
ing on the underlying assumptions, but indicate 
that deadweight losses would range from 1% to 
over 8%. A survey of multiple studies yields an 
average of 3.5%. Adding up both losses—5% on 
the consumption side and 3.5% on the production 
side—provides a rough measure of the total cost 
of protectionism. With a 25% reduction in inter-
national trade, social welfare suffers deadweight 
losses of 8.5%. This means that as long as a 25% 
reduction in trade persists, national income will 
be 8.5% lower. The Great Depression provides a 
historical example of a drop in international trade 
on this scale. A large percentage of the reduction 
in national income that was experienced can be 
attributed to protectionist measures (see Box).10
Measured in terms of the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP, the US and Germany’s level 
of economic openness is around twice as high 
today as it was before the Great Depression. 
Financial markets are also much more closely 
interconnected. Consequently, the impact that 
protectionist measures would have on national 
income would become necessarily greater today. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the Great Depression, 
governments are more likely in the current crisis 
to resort to veiled, non-tariff barriers to trade. 
This is because most nations are members of the 
WTO and cannot impose tariff hikes at will.11 
Yet veiled protectionist measures can have an 
even greater impact than tariffs. Compliance 
with new administrative regulations for imports, 
for example, can prove so difficult to fulfill that 
they prevent trade completely.
Consideration must also be given to the manner 
with which protectionism affects individual social 
groups. Declines in production are associated with 
job losses, and because these primarily affect less 
10 The US also played a central role in intensifying the Great Depres sion 
with the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930, which drastically in-
creased tariffs. This contributed to a trade war in which nations attempt-
ed to shore up domestic industry and employment through isolationism 
and devaluation but achieved exactly the opposite—global trade was 
disrupted on a lasting basis and the international division of labor col-
lapsed. See Archibald, R. B., D. H. Feldman: Investment During the Great 
Depression: Uncertainty and the Role of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, in: 
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1998, pp. 857-879; and Irwin, 
D.: The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment, in: Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, No. 2, 1998, pp. 326-334.
11 If a nation raises tariffs anyway, it must reckon with WTO sanctions. 
This can take a long time, however, and ultimately, if a country fails to 
comply with a WTO ruling, the WTO can only permit other countries to 
impose countermeasures against the country in violation. As a last resort, 
the country that is in violation of the rules can also be excluded from the 
organization. However, this would only contribute to further protection-
ism.
skilled workers first, groups with comparatively 
low incomes suffer more from reductions in trade. 
Low-income groups also consume a comparatively 
higher share of their income. As a result, production-
side efficiency losses and resulting price increases 
affect such groups more severely.
Proposals for the Improvement of 
the Institutional Framework for 
Trade
The Bretton Woods institutions—i.e. the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)—
were created in 1944 in part to prevent a resur-
gence of protectionist measures in an economic 
crisis. According to Article VIII of the IMF’s 
statutes,  balance-of-payment  restrictions  are 
forbidden. The IMF and World Bank provide 
comprehensive financing facilities so that coun-
tries with declining exports do not have trouble 
financing trade deficits in a moment of crisis. 
With outside assistance, the country is provided 
with time to make economic reforms and boost 
the competitiveness of its exports. Beyond the 
Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO has its 
own adjudicative mechanism. The EU member 
states are also subject to European law. Although 
extensive, this institutional framework is not 
sufficient to prevent protectionist measures from 
Figure 3













1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Germany
USA
1 Sum of exports and imports in relation to GDP.
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Box
Protectionism and Global Trade during 
the Great Depression
In the early phase of the Great Depression (1929-1933), 
real global trade decreased by one third, real production 
in the USA and Germany dropped by 30%, and the unem-
ployment rate rose to 25% in the US and nearly 30% in 
Germany. Although drastic tariff increases in the US were 
not implemented until the passage of the Smoot-Hawley 
Act in June of 1930—the year after the collapse of the 
stock market—the Act is viewed as partly responsible 
for the crash of October 1929 because of the debate 
that preceded its passage and worries of protectionism, 
which had a negative impact on stock prices.1 The mere 
discussion of protectionism can have immediate effects 
on markets and has negatively influenced stock prices in 
the current crisis.
An empirical analysis of the causes of the strong decline 
in international trade during the Great Depression reveals 
that approximately half of the decline can be attributed 
to discretionary protectionist measures and the other half 
to the general reduction in income. This analysis also ac-
counted for feedback effects.2 Protectionism is subdivided 
into tariff and non-tariff measures as well as effective 
tariff increases resulting from the deflationary process 
over time (under nominally fixed tariffs). The “contribu-
tion” made by each of these elements to the decline in 
trade was estimated at eight percentage points for tariff 
measures, six percentage points for non-tariff measures, 
and five percentage points for inflation-induced restraints 
on trade (for a historical comparison of the levels of open-
ness of national economies, see the chart below).
Granted, it is impossible to draw conclusions about the 
effect of protectionism on income trends directly from 
these estimates because the connection between the 
global volume of trade and effective income trends var-
ied from country to country. In the US and Germany, the 
effective decline in income during the Great Depression 
nearly equaled the decline in effective international trade, 
i.e. real income reacted very elastically to changes in the 
real volume of international trade. Because this assess-
ment places the blame for approximately half of the de-
cline in international trade during the Great Depression 
squarely on the shoulders of protectionism, the decline 
in income could have potentially been cut in half if the 
Smoot-Hawley Act and protectionism on all sides had 
been prevented.
1 However, the key cause of the collapse in stock prices was not anxiety 
about protectionism, but  excessive profit expectations based on a tech-
nology push (like e.g. electricity, automobiles, chemistry and aerospace 
industries) and a real estate price bubble.
2 Madsen, J.B.: Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade during 
the Great Depression, in: Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 67, No. 4, 
2001, pp. 848-868.
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being implemented in times of need. 
For this reason, the regulations and 
institutions currently in place should 
be reviewed. In the process, it should 
be remembered that institutional rules 
have proven ineffective time and again 
precisely at the moment when they are 
most required. Governments simply 
circumvent, repeal, or change them. 
This is especially true where large, 
powerful nations are concerned.
The role of the IMF could be strength-
ened  by  improving  its  legitimacy 
through a change in the process by 
which lead officials are selected, so 
that qualified candidates are consid-
ered regardless of nationality.12 A re-
duced emphasis on the voting rights 
of the traditional member nations as 
well as a reduction in the minimum 
number of votes for certain decisions 
would also be necessary in order to 
weaken US veto power. The IMF’s 
resources could also be expanded. In 
the current crisis, for example, the US 
Federal Reserve alone has extended 
the credit volume by more than $600 
billion. The IMF, by contrast, has only 
additionally supplied $50 billion since 
September of 2008. The IMF’s total 
resources are also limited to $250 bil-
lion. However, although many have 
argued for increasing the IMF’s re-
sources, one objection that could be 
raised to this proposal is that the IMF 
has repeatedly made serious mistakes 
when advising countries in need of aid, 
in some cases even leading to currency 
crises.13
12 See Truman, E.: IMF Reform: An Unfinished Agenda, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 28 Ja-
nuary  2009,  www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/
opeds/oped.cfm.
13 Stiglitz, J. E.: Globalization and Its Discontents, New 
York,  2002,    The  Roaring  Nineties.  Washington  D.C., 
2003; and Making Globalization Work, New York, 2006 
There is a wealth of literature documenting the theore-
tical and empirical flaws in the design of the IMF and its 
policies, see, for instance, Jong-Wha, L., S. Kwanho: IMF 
Bailouts and Moral Hazard, in: Journal of International 
Finance, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2008, pp. 816-830; Dreher, A., 
R. Vaubel: The Causes and Consequences of IMF Condi-
tionality, in: Emerging Markets and Trade, Vol. 40, No. 
3, 2004, pp. 26-54; Evrensel, A.: Effectiveness of IMF-
supported Stabilization Programs in Developing Coun-
tries. Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 
21, No. 5, 2002, pp. 565-587. Following the Asian and 
then global financial crisis in 1997/98 the “internation-
al financial architecture” was already reformed, among 
other measures  the “Financial  Stability Institute” was 
founded (as an extension of the Bank for International 
Settlements in Basel) whose members are the banking 
As a possible alternative or supplement to stock-
ing up the IMF’s resources and as an alternative 
to the ad hoc balance-of-payment loans currently 
being extended by the USA, EU, and other indus-
trialized nations, the creation of a special subcom-
mittee of the G-20 for quick decision-making on 
balance-of-payment loans in times of crisis should 
be considered.14 The G-20 was created in response 
to the international monetary and financial crisis of 
1998. Its further refinement thus appears to be a logi-
cal step. The advantage of a G-20 subcommittee 
over the IMF as well as ad hoc measures taken by 
central banks would lie in the direct availability of 
resources, rapidity, heightened legitimacy, and im-
proved efficiency, as discussion and coordination 
would take place directly between governments 
in the G-20 subcommittee. By contrast, lending 
policies undertaken by the IMF or specific nations 
are de facto subject to the influence of a small cir-
cle of individuals, even though, in the case of the 
IMF, a formal decision is made by the Board of 
Govenors.15
The proposed addition of a subcommittee to the G-20 
for balance-of-payments loans leads to another con-
sideration.  The G-20 has evolved into a very impor-
tant body for international coordination. The EU is 
represented in the G-20 by four countries (Italy, 
France, Germany, and the UK) as well as by the 
presidents of the EU Council and the European 
Central Bank (ECB). If the EU created a commit-
tee that was responsible for improved coordina-
tion of EU economic policy, the four represented 
EU countries might be more willing to agree on 
a single joint EU representative. This would not 
only help to give the G-20 more clout, but would 
also implicitly compel the EU nations to come to 
an agreement and stake out a uniform position 
prior to G-20 meetings.
supervisory authorities, the finance ministries and central banks of indus-
trialized countries. Together with an enhanced capital markets division 
of the IMF it was expected that this reform could effectively prevent repe-
tition of worldwide financial crises. In addition there have been repeated 
warnings in 2006-2007 from renouned scientists of a comimg substanti-
al financial crisis in the US, for instance by Professor Nouriel Roubini (Co-
lumbia University, New York City) at lectures at IMF premises. The IMF re-
jected these warnings by arguing that Roubini’s analysis lacked a formal 
mathematical  model.  See,  for  instance  www.nyt.com/2008/08/17/
magazine/17pessimist-t.html and New York Times, June 6, 2006. 
14 Despite the recent agreement among the G-20 countries to increase 
IMF lending resources, considerable disagreement remains among them 
about how the world economic system and in particular the IMF should 
be reformed. In this regard, see the G-20 Finance Ministers‘ and Central 
Bank of Governors‘ communiqué in Horsham, Great Britain of 14 March 
2009 as well as the Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the 
World Economy in Washington, D.C., of 15 November 2008.
15 Because the IMF Board of Governors holds a limited number of meet-
ings each year with more than 170 member nations with periodic reports 
in addition to numerous special studies and administrative papers, it is 
virtually impossible for the individual Governors to find, understand, and 
scrutinize hidden important details about transactions regarding specific 
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Conclusion
The global economic crisis is creating strong political incentives for individual 
nations to close off their markets in order to protect domestic employment. If a 
trade war results, this could lead to a massive additional disruption of the global 
economy. Because trade relations are generally based on specialization advan-
tages, an interruption or lasting obstruction of trade would cost all countries 
dearly in the end.
In light of this, comprehensive institutional reforms must be made in the organiza-
tions responsible for the supervision and regulation of international trade relations 
and global financial markets: the WTO and IMF. In the process, major developing 
and emerging nations must be afforded a greater opportunity to participate, as has 
already been done in the G-20. The G-20 should play a bigger role in combating 
international financial crises. In order to bring the interests of EU member nations 
to bear more effectively, a single joint representative should be sent to the G-20 
instead of individual representatives from each of the four major EU member na-
tions. This would require a more intensive process of coordination among the EU 
states. A delegation of strong representatives within the G-20 would also constitute 
a more effective counterbalance to the perennial domination of the US. On the 
whole, this could prove to be a much stronger deterrent to unilateral trade policies 
and the non-adherence of individual nations to legal and regulatory frameworks 
for free trade.